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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-3251
_____________
BALJIT SINGH,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
_____________
On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
A088-231-521
_____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a),
January 9, 2012
BEFORE: FUENTES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: February 22, 2012 )
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________

FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Baljit Singh appeals the Decision and Order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
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Torture (“CAT”). For the following reasons, we deny the petition and affirm the decision
of the BIA.1
I.
Because we write only for the parties, we discuss only those facts to the extent
necessary for the resolution of the issues raised on appeal.
Singh entered the United States on October 3, 2006 from the Hoshipur Province in
India. In February 2007, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to
Appear, charging that he was an alien present in the United States without being admitted
or paroled, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Singh conceded the charge of
removability, but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under CAT. The
Immigration Judge held a hearing on Singh’s application.
At the hearing, Singh testified that he fled India and was afraid to return because
he refused to join his village’s ruling party . Specifically, he said that the Congress Party,
the ruling party at the time, harassed, arrested, and beat him because he refused to join
them. On one occasion, he was injured and his mother treated him. On another occasion
he sought medical treatment at a local hospital.
Singh also testified that his brother was similarly harassed. He also testified that
he fears returning to India because the Congress Party is still in power and that he has
been informed that the authorities are still looking for him.
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The BIA had jurisdiction over Singh’s appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). We
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
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The IJ issued an oral decision denying his application. Specifically, the IJ found
that Singh was not credible, had not presented sufficient corroborating testimony, and had
not established future fear of persecution under CAT. As to Singh’s credibility, the
Immigration Judge highlighted three inconsistencies in his testimony. First, he noted that
Singh was inconsistent with the name of the hospital where he was treated. He testified
that the name of the hospital was Pala Tanda, but the medical record shows it was Bhela
Maternity and General Hospital. Also, Singh was inconsistent about the amount of time
he spent in the hospital. He testified he slept in the hospital for two nights, yet the record
he submitted showed he was there only one night. Finally, the IJ found there to be
inconsistencies in the manner in which Singh crossed the border. In his asylum
application, Singh stated that he arrived in the United States by ship. Before the IJ, he
testified he arrived in the United States by car.
As to corroboration, the IJ determined that Singh could have, but failed to, provide
corroboration for his testimony regarding the first aid rendered by his mother and the
harassment his brother suffered at the hands of Congress party members. He stated that
his mother treated his injuries and submitted an affidavit from his mother. The affidavit
made no mention of providing any treatment. Further, Singh named only his brother as
someone who was similarly harassed. However, Singh did not provide an affidavit from
him corroborating his experience. The IJ found that while Singh did not speak to his
brother, his parents did and he could have gotten an affidavit from his brother through
that channel. Finally, the IJ determined that Singh had failed to establish he had a wellfounded fear of future harm and thus relief under CAT was unwarranted.
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Based on the above, the IJ denied the application. The BIA affirmed the IJ on all
grounds. This appeal followed.
II.
When the BIA issues an opinion, we review that decision. Fei Mei Cheng v. Att’y
Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2010). We review the BIA’s conclusions of law de
novo, subject to the appropriate deference, and we review the BIA’s factual finding for
substantial evidence. Id. Under the “substantial evidence” standard, we reverse only if a
“reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quoting
Toure v. Att'y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2006)).
Adverse credibility findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.
Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Because Singh filed
his application after 2005, the REAL ID Act applies. See Chukwu v. Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d
185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). Under the Act, an IJ’s adverse credibility determination may be
based on any inconsistencies in the record, without regard to whether they relate to the
heart of the applicant’s claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Even if the testimony is credible, Singh may still be required to corroborate
aspects of his testimony in order to meet his burden of proof. Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562
F.3d 246, 252 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2009). Our review of such a determination is subject to the
same substantial evidence standard as a credibility determination. Id. An applicant must
provide such evidence when “it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence and there
is no satisfactory explanation for its absence,” such as when the testimony is “central to
an applicant’s claim and easily subject to verification.” Id. at 252. An IJ is obligated to
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undertake a three-part inquiry before concluding that, because of a lack of corroborating
evidence, an applicant has failed to carry his burden of proof: “(1) identify the testimony
for which it is reasonable to expect the applicant to produce corroboration; (2) examine
whether the applicant corroborated that testimony; and (3) analyze whether the applicant
has adequately explained any failure to provide corroboration.” Id. at 253.
A.
To qualify for asylum, Singh must show that he is “unable or unwilling to return to
[India] ... because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). An applicant’s failure to
demonstrate eligibility for asylum necessarily means that he failed to meet the higher
burden of proof for statutory withholding of removal. See Mudric v. Attorney General,
469 F.3d 94, 102 n.8 (3d Cir.2006).
While not a particularly compelling adverse credibility finding, we cannot say that
the record compels a different conclusion. For example, in his asylum application, Singh
said he arrived in the United States by ship, A.R. 000298, but testified that he crossed the
border in a car, A.R. 000136-37. When the IJ confronted him about this inconsistency
and elicited further testimony, his story changed several times. He said he arrived by
ship, then changed his testimony to he arrived by taxi and then boarded and waited on a
ship. While this does not go to the heart of the Singh’s claim and strikes us as relatively
minor, this inconsistency combined with the other minor inconsistencies, does not
compel a conclusion that Singh is credible.
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Even if the testimony was credible, the BIA’s determination that Singh failed to
present readily available corroborating testimony is also supported by substantial
evidence. In his testimony, Singh referenced that his brother was similarly mistreated for
his unwillingness to be politically active, yet he did not provide any documentation
corroborating his story. When the IJ probed further, Singh indicated he did not have
contact with his brother but his parents, whom Singh was in contact with, did. Thus, the
IJ’s determination that Singh failed to corroborate his testimony is supported by
substantial evidence.
III.
We have considered Singh’s remaining arguments and find them without merit.
We will deny the petition.
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